Strelnikov
4th Level Red Feather
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THe author of this piece is a British military historian, and the gold standard by which all such should be judged. He wrote this for the 13 Nov 2003 edition of the London Daily Telegraph.
Comments, anyone?
Strelnikov
*******************************************
Like It Or Not, America Is Becoming An Imperial Power
By John Keegan
Donald Rumsfeld, the US Secretary of Defence, believes that Saddam Hussein is alive and hiding somewhere in Iraq. He also believes that he will be found by the coalition forces.
Mr Rumsfeld, whom I met last week, is visibly undeterred by the level of continuing terrorism in Iraq. He is convinced that the coalition campaign is going well, that the military problem is being overcome and that the reconstruction of the country is proceeding rapidly. Yesterday's tragic attack on the Italian police HQ in Nasiriyah will not change that view.
Mr Rumsfeld read me a series of reports, from the American regional commands, summarising progress achieved: terrorists apprehended, weapons recovered, explosives destroyed. The totals were impressive. Despite daily reports of American casualties, he was dismissive of the danger to coalition forces. Within the context of the total security situation, he sees the level of violence as bearable and believes that the trend of terrorist activity is downward.
He foresees a reduction of the size of the coalition force, now largely American but with a big British element, over the coming months. That will be achieved by the introduction of other forces from outside. He particularly hopes for a Pakistani division. The main means of reducing dependence on outside forces, however, will be an increase in Iraq's own security forces, the border patrol, the police, the civil defence corps, the facilities protection service and the new Iraqi army.
Economically, the outlook is strongly positive. Electricity supply actually exceeds pre-war levels, with an output of 4,400 megawatts per day in October, as against 3,300 in January. Oil production is returning to pre-war levels, at nearly 2,200 million barrels per day in October, as against 2,500 million barrels before the war.
Socially, the country has returned to normal. More than 3.6 million children are in primary school and 1.5 million in secondary school. University registrations have increased from 63,000 before the war to 97,000. Healthcare is at pre-war levels and is improving rapidly, because of greatly increased spending, estimated to be at 26 times pre-war levels. Doctors' salaries are eight times higher and vaccination and drug distribution programmes have also been greatly increased.
Mr Rumsfeld was also keen to emphasise the degree of progress made in introducing democratic institutions into Iraq, not only at the national but also the local level. All Iraqis are now represented in a series of provincial councils. The councils are at present appointed, but the intention is that they should be elected in the near future.
It is a criticism of American policy, advanced with increasing frequency, that it seeks to create a democratic Iraq at too rapid a pace, without regard to the country's history of subordination to colonial rule and of the recent dictatorship.
Mr Rumsfeld is well aware of the difficulties. He is not, as is often alleged, insensitive to the past. On the contrary, he revealed a considerable knowledge of Iraqi history, derived from wide reading in the subject. We had a lively discussion on the subject of Gertrude Bell, the Arabist who served as Oriental Secretary to the British Mandate administration during the foundation of modern Iraq in the early 1920s. Her intimate knowledge of Iraqi society did much to establish Iraq in its modern form.
Nevertheless, it became clear to me, during other discussions I held in America during my visit, that there is widespread concern about the nature of the post-war settlement that the US is trying to impose. I was frequently asked why there is so much less trouble in the British than the American area of occupation. Was it because of greater Arab hostility to the Americans or do the British troops know something about peacemaking that Americans do not?
This is a ticklish question for a visiting Briton to answer. I greatly admire the American armed forces and shrink from suggesting that their approach is clumsy or insensitive. Nevertheless, I said that the British, as a lesser Satan, were likely to be less unpopular than the Americans with Islamic fundamentalists who regard the United States as the Great Satan.
I also conceded that the British, operating in the southern Shia area, where Saddam remains intensely unpopular, have the easier task compared with that of the Americans, who have to police the Sunni area that was also Saddam's heartland. Basra, as a great Gulf trading city, has a long association with the outside world and with Britain in particular, going back to the days of the East India Company.
None the less, I suggested, there is a fundamental difference between the British and the American approach. While the Americans, for reasons connected with their own past, seek to solve the Iraqi problem by encouraging the development of democracy, the British, with their long experience of colonial campaigning and their recent exposure to Irish terrorism, take a more pragmatic attitude.
They recognise that Iraq is still a tribal society and that the key to pacification lies in identifying tribal leaders and other big men, in recognising social divisions that can be exploited, and in using a mixture of stick and carrot to restore and maintain order.
To my surprise, this analysis did not arouse American hostility. I formed the impression that Americans thought the British approach thoroughly sensible and would support it if adopted by their own side.
Forcibly, America is becoming an imperial if not an imperialist country. The attitude was exemplified by an encounter I had with a tall, lean, crew-cut young man I met in Washington. Our conversation went as follows: "Marine?" I asked. "Yes," he answered. "Have you been in Iraq?" "Afghanistan. Just got back." The exchange was straight out of Kipling. There is a lot more of that to come.
Comments, anyone?
Strelnikov
*******************************************
Like It Or Not, America Is Becoming An Imperial Power
By John Keegan
Donald Rumsfeld, the US Secretary of Defence, believes that Saddam Hussein is alive and hiding somewhere in Iraq. He also believes that he will be found by the coalition forces.
Mr Rumsfeld, whom I met last week, is visibly undeterred by the level of continuing terrorism in Iraq. He is convinced that the coalition campaign is going well, that the military problem is being overcome and that the reconstruction of the country is proceeding rapidly. Yesterday's tragic attack on the Italian police HQ in Nasiriyah will not change that view.
Mr Rumsfeld read me a series of reports, from the American regional commands, summarising progress achieved: terrorists apprehended, weapons recovered, explosives destroyed. The totals were impressive. Despite daily reports of American casualties, he was dismissive of the danger to coalition forces. Within the context of the total security situation, he sees the level of violence as bearable and believes that the trend of terrorist activity is downward.
He foresees a reduction of the size of the coalition force, now largely American but with a big British element, over the coming months. That will be achieved by the introduction of other forces from outside. He particularly hopes for a Pakistani division. The main means of reducing dependence on outside forces, however, will be an increase in Iraq's own security forces, the border patrol, the police, the civil defence corps, the facilities protection service and the new Iraqi army.
Economically, the outlook is strongly positive. Electricity supply actually exceeds pre-war levels, with an output of 4,400 megawatts per day in October, as against 3,300 in January. Oil production is returning to pre-war levels, at nearly 2,200 million barrels per day in October, as against 2,500 million barrels before the war.
Socially, the country has returned to normal. More than 3.6 million children are in primary school and 1.5 million in secondary school. University registrations have increased from 63,000 before the war to 97,000. Healthcare is at pre-war levels and is improving rapidly, because of greatly increased spending, estimated to be at 26 times pre-war levels. Doctors' salaries are eight times higher and vaccination and drug distribution programmes have also been greatly increased.
Mr Rumsfeld was also keen to emphasise the degree of progress made in introducing democratic institutions into Iraq, not only at the national but also the local level. All Iraqis are now represented in a series of provincial councils. The councils are at present appointed, but the intention is that they should be elected in the near future.
It is a criticism of American policy, advanced with increasing frequency, that it seeks to create a democratic Iraq at too rapid a pace, without regard to the country's history of subordination to colonial rule and of the recent dictatorship.
Mr Rumsfeld is well aware of the difficulties. He is not, as is often alleged, insensitive to the past. On the contrary, he revealed a considerable knowledge of Iraqi history, derived from wide reading in the subject. We had a lively discussion on the subject of Gertrude Bell, the Arabist who served as Oriental Secretary to the British Mandate administration during the foundation of modern Iraq in the early 1920s. Her intimate knowledge of Iraqi society did much to establish Iraq in its modern form.
Nevertheless, it became clear to me, during other discussions I held in America during my visit, that there is widespread concern about the nature of the post-war settlement that the US is trying to impose. I was frequently asked why there is so much less trouble in the British than the American area of occupation. Was it because of greater Arab hostility to the Americans or do the British troops know something about peacemaking that Americans do not?
This is a ticklish question for a visiting Briton to answer. I greatly admire the American armed forces and shrink from suggesting that their approach is clumsy or insensitive. Nevertheless, I said that the British, as a lesser Satan, were likely to be less unpopular than the Americans with Islamic fundamentalists who regard the United States as the Great Satan.
I also conceded that the British, operating in the southern Shia area, where Saddam remains intensely unpopular, have the easier task compared with that of the Americans, who have to police the Sunni area that was also Saddam's heartland. Basra, as a great Gulf trading city, has a long association with the outside world and with Britain in particular, going back to the days of the East India Company.
None the less, I suggested, there is a fundamental difference between the British and the American approach. While the Americans, for reasons connected with their own past, seek to solve the Iraqi problem by encouraging the development of democracy, the British, with their long experience of colonial campaigning and their recent exposure to Irish terrorism, take a more pragmatic attitude.
They recognise that Iraq is still a tribal society and that the key to pacification lies in identifying tribal leaders and other big men, in recognising social divisions that can be exploited, and in using a mixture of stick and carrot to restore and maintain order.
To my surprise, this analysis did not arouse American hostility. I formed the impression that Americans thought the British approach thoroughly sensible and would support it if adopted by their own side.
Forcibly, America is becoming an imperial if not an imperialist country. The attitude was exemplified by an encounter I had with a tall, lean, crew-cut young man I met in Washington. Our conversation went as follows: "Marine?" I asked. "Yes," he answered. "Have you been in Iraq?" "Afghanistan. Just got back." The exchange was straight out of Kipling. There is a lot more of that to come.
